Imperfectly Competitive Business Cycles With Underemployment

Laurence Lasselle and Serge Svizzero

CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: We investigate how imperfect competition affects the occurence and properties of endogenous business cycles with underemployment in an overlapping generations model. We consider a competitive product market in association with an imperfect labour market. The latter is presented in two variants. These differ from each other by the game-theoretical concepts used in the description of market equilibria, namely the cooperative concept of Nash-Bargaining and the noncooperative concept of Nash-Cournot. Although they are different, both cases admit the union-monopoly as a limit case. We show that the existence of cycles depends on the degree of market power. Our results are illustrated for specific preferences and technology.

Keywords: price-elasticity; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D43 E24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10
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Working Paper: Imperfectly Competitive Business Cycles With Underemployment (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:0011

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