The Scope of Chadwick's Bidding Scheme

Antony Dnes

CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: In this paper, I examine the scope of Chadwick's principle of contract management. I show that Chadwick targeted his bidding scheme at a number of social evils he perceived to be attached to unregulated cpmpetition and not just at decreasing-cost natural monopoly. I also show that his scheme requires a tax to be added in any application involving increasing costs. It may then be a useful form of regulation, depending upon the costs and benefits of contract management.

JEL-codes: L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:9301

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm Department of Economics, Castlecliffe, The Scores, St Andrews, KY16 9AZ. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Department of Economics, The University of St Andrews Business School ().