Franchising, Externality and Dual Distribution

Antony Dnes

CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: This paper examines dual distribution in franchising systems, which arises when franchisors simultaneously operate franchised and company-owned outlets. Dual distribution is explained in terms of non-separable externality, which increases the costs of franchising compared with separable externality. A model is developed to illustrate this explanation.

JEL-codes: L14 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:9402

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