Risk Management in Venture Capital Investor-Investee Relations

Gavin Reid, Nicholas G Terry and Julia Smith

CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of risk handling arrangements adopted in the relationship between the venture capital investor and his investee. The theoretical framework adopted is principal-agent analysis, which views the investee as a risk averse agent entering into a risk sharing contract with the investor, a risk neutral (fully diversified) principal. The sample analysed is made up of twenty venture capital investors in the UK over the period 1992-93, and (where available) their corresponding investee(s). These investors accounted for about three quarters of venture capital activity in the UK over this period. The paper reports on evidence gathered by semi-structured interviews with investors and investees, on expected returns, portfolio balance, screening and risk sharing.

Keywords: venture capital; risk management; information asymmetry; investor-investee relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G23 L84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Risk management in venture capital investor-investee relations (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:9505

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