Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

Kalyan Chatterjee and Hamid Sabourian

CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the a justification for stationary equilibrium strategies in the class of games where complexity costs matter. As is well-known, in this game every individually rational allocation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium (also as a subgame perfect equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient and if n>2). Moreover, delays in agreement are also possible in such equilibria. By limiting ourselves to strategies that can be implemented by a machine (automaton) and by suitably modifying the definition of complexity for the purpose of analysing a single extensive form, we find that complexity costs do not reduce the range of possible allocations but they do limit the amount of delay that can occur in any agreement. In particular, we show that in any n-player game, for any allocation z, an agreement on z at any time period t can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the machine game with complexity costs if and only if in equilibrium, the machines implement stationary strategies. Finally, we also show that "noisy Nash equilibrium" with complexity costs sustain only the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocation.

Keywords: Complexity costs; agreement delay; automata; noisy Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity (2000)
Working Paper: Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:9808

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