Electoral Systems and Immigration Policies

Matteo Gamalerio (), Massimo Morelli () and Margherita Negri
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Matteo Gamalerio: University of Barcelona
Massimo Morelli: Bocconi University

No 2503, Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, The University of St Andrews Business School

Abstract: We show that polities using plurality rule to elect their policymakers are more likely to adopt more restrictive immigration policies than those using dual-ballot systems. Plurality rule provides stronger incentives for right-wing, anti-immigrant parties to run alone, as opposed to joining a coalition with other right-wing parties that offer a less restrictive immigration policy. We prove the result theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical results hold with sincere and strategic voters, with and without endogenous turnout, and can be extended to the comparison between plurality rule and proportional representation without majority bonuses in parliamentary elections. Empirically, we combine municipal-level data on migration-related expenditures and mayoral elections and establish causality using a regression discontinuity design.

Keywords: Electoral rules; Immigration; Salience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J24 J61 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac and nep-pol
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