Risky jobs and wage differentialsAn indirect test for segregation
Vincenzo Carrieri (),
Edoardo Di Porto () and
Leandro Elia ()
No 144, Working Papers from University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics
Social scientists have developed several indicators to address the existence of segregation processes. Thispaper deals with labor market segregation in risky jobs and suggests a simple indirect way to detect segregation based on battery of statistical tests in a well-established microeconomics setting: the theory ofcompensating wage differentials. The test is based on matching estimator and the Rosenbaum bounds test and allows us to detect segregation while correcting for the selection bias that affect standard estimates,commonly based on OLS. We apply our test to the Italian labor market and we detect a strong segmentationin risky jobs. According to the theory, workers segregated in risky jobs, earn a lower wage.
Keywords: wage differentials; risky jobs; segregation; propensity score matching; Rosenbaum bounds. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 J31 J28 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-lma
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