Unobserved Contributions and Political Influence: Evidence from the Death of Top Donors

Marco Battaglini, Valerio Leone Sciabolazza, Mengwei Lin and Eleonora Patacchini

No 277, Working Papers in Public Economics from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome

Abstract: It has long been observed that there is little money in U.S. politics compared to the stakes. But what if contributions are not fully observable or non-monetary in nature and thus not easily quantifiable? We study this question with a new data set on the top 1000 donors in U.S. congressional races. Since top donors do not randomly support candidates, we propose an identification strategy based on information about top donors' deaths and the observed variations in candidates' performance after these events. The death of a top donor significantly decreases a candidate's chances of being elected in the current and future election cycles. Moreover, it affects the legislative activities of elected candidates. These effects do not depend on top donors' monetary contributions to a candidate but on their prominence and their total contributions during the election campaign.

Keywords: Campaign Finance; Top Donors; Tullock Paradox; Electoral Outcomes; Political Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 90
Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
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