La regolazione dei servizi pubblici in condizione di informazione asimmetrica
Giuseppe Croce ()
No 31, Working Papers from University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics
The aim of this paper is to review the main features of the new theory of public utilities regulation, theoretically assuming asymmetric information. The results considered imply a departure from first best outcomes and give way to a strategic interaction between firm and regulator. The role of the constraints of participation and incentive-compatibility faced by the regulator trying to improve efficiency is also highlighted. The institutional nature of the regulation prevails over the technological one and sheds new light on the issues concerning public intervention in this field.
Keywords: regulation; asymmetric information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp31
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