Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the UK
Colin Mayer () and
Stefano Rossi ()
OFRC Working Papers Series from Oxford Financial Research Centre
Family ownership was rapidly diluted in the twentieth century in Britain. Issuance of equity in the process of acquisitions was the main cause. In the first half of the century, it occurred in the absence of minority investor protection and relied on directors of target firms protecting the interests of shareholders. Families were able to retain control by occupying a disproportionate number of seats on the boards of firms. However, in the absence of large stakes, the rise of hostile takeovers and institutional shareholders made it increasingly difficult for families to maintain control without challenge. Potential targets attempted to protect themselves through dual class shares and strategic share blocks but these were dismantled in response to opposition by institutional shareholders and the London Stock Exchange. The result was a regulated market in corporate control and a capital market that looked very different from its European counterparts. Thus, while acquisitions facilitated the growth of family controlled firms in the first half of the century, they also diluted their ownership and ultimately their control in the second half.
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-his
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Working Paper: Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the UK (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2003fe15
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in OFRC Working Papers Series from Oxford Financial Research Centre Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maxine Collett ().