Life Insurance: Regulation as Contract Enforcement

Alan Morrison ()

OFRC Working Papers Series from Oxford Financial Research Centre

Abstract: Debating the minutiae of insurance regulation without a clear understanding of why insurance companies are regulated is futile. In this non-technical essay I discuss the economic rationale for insurance business regulation. I conclude that the appropriate role of the regulator in this industry is to enforce contracts which would otherwise be broken. This implies that regulation should be optional, and that regulation need not be a monopoly activity.

Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ias and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.finance.ox.ac.uk/file_links/finecon_papers/2004fe09.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.finance.ox.ac.uk:80 (No such host is known. )

Related works:
Journal Article: LIFE INSURANCE: REGULATION AS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2004fe09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in OFRC Working Papers Series from Oxford Financial Research Centre Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maxine Collett ().