MONOPOLISTIC SECURITY DESIGN IN FINANCE ECONOMIES

Karl Schmedders

No 129, Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: Asset markets are usually incomplete. Security exchanges often introduce derivative securities which partially complete the market. The marketmakers make profits through a bid-ask spread. We use computational methods to determine the profit-maximizing choice of options for a marketmaker and examine how the optimal option depends on tastes

Date: 2000-07-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Monopolistic security design in finance economies (2001)
Working Paper: Monopolistic Security Design in Finance Economies (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf0:129

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