SPATIAL RESTRICTIONS AND COALITION FORMATION: A COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH

Benjamin Alamar
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Benjamin Alamar: University of California

No 274, Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: This paper illustrates the lack of research in the area of the process by which coalitions formed. Showing how the questions regarding process have been previously ignored, it demonstrates their importance. Then motives for a computational approach are addressed. The main point being that in order to analyze coalition formation, we must allow agents to actually make decisions and form coalitions. Then a model of coalition formation around a public good is proposed that consists of agents that have the ability to move a make decisions, a tree structure that represents the agent's paths taken to form a coalition and an auctioneer who adjusts the tax rate at any given node in order to attract agents. Then an experiment, using the model, is defined in order to analyze the affects that spatial restrictions have on coalition formation. Finally potential applications and modifications of the model are discussed.

Date: 2000-07-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf0:274

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