Bounded Rationality and Social Cognition: A Computational Study
Robert Hoffmann ()
No 172, Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 from Society for Computational Economics
This paper examines the implications of a 'strong' version of bounded rationality popular within computational and evolutionary game theory in which agents are represented by finite automata. It is argued that this view has unrealistic features in that agents of this kind are unable to distinguish between opponent or game types. An alternative view of bounded rationality from social cognition accommodating opponent-specific choices is presented and analyzed by computer simulation.
Keywords: bounded rationality; social cognition; genetic algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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