Strategic Choice of Partners: Research Joint Ventures and Market Power

Siebert, Roeller, Tombak

No 185, Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: The literature on research joint ventures (RJVs) has emphasized internalizing spillovers and cost-sharing as motives for RJV formation. In this paper we develop an additional explanation: the incentive to exclude rivals in order to gain market power. We illustrate this effect in a simple model of RJV formation with asymmetric firms. We then test our hypothesis by estimating an endogeneous switching model using data from the U.S. National Cooperative Research Act. The empirical findings support our hypothesis that RJVs can be used as an instrument by which firms leverage their market power in the product market.

Keywords: Research; Joint; Ventures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L0 L6 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf1:185

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 from Society for Computational Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().