Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Good:Learning to be a Free Rider

Christiane Clemens and Thomas Riechmann
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Christiane Clemens

No 92, Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: This paper explores the question whether boundedly rational agents learn to behave optimally when asked to voluntarily contribute to a public good. The decision process of individuals is described by an Evolutionary Algorithm. We find that the contribution level converges towards the Nash equilibrium although exact free rider-behavior is never observed. The latter result corresponds to findings from experiments on voluntary contribution to a public good. Crucial determinants of the learning process are the population size and the propensity to experiment.

Keywords: bounded rationality; evolutionary games; experiments; genetic algorithms; learning; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C73 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Good: Learning to be a Free Rider (2001)
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