Treasury Auctions, Uniform or Discriminatory?: An Agent-based Approach
No 241, Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 from Society for Computational Economics
Keywords: Agent-based; treasury auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Treasury Auctions, Uniform or Discriminatory?: An Agent-Based Approach (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf3:241
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