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Treasury Auctions, Uniform or Discriminatory?: An Agent-based Approach

Deddy Koesrindartoto

No 241, Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 from Society for Computational Economics

Keywords: Agent-based; treasury auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-08-01
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