An algorithmic solution to the interval Kyoto game
Christophe Deissenberg and
No 312, Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 from Society for Computational Economics
The conference of Kyoto 1997 instutionalized a new and important economic instrument for environmental protection, the Joint Implementation Progran (JI). The concept of Joint Implementation involves a bilateral or multilateral deal in which countries facing high pollution abatment costs invest in abatment in countries with lower costs, and receive credit for the resulting reduction in greenhouse gas emmission. The Technology-Emissions-Means (TEM) model developped by Pickl (1999) aims at embedding the Joint Implementation process into an optimal energy management model that takes into account all relevant technical and financial constraints. Based on this model, we present a new bargaining approach for an efficient international bargaining procedure within the so-called interval Kyoto game.
Keywords: Dynamic games; bargaining; Kyoto process; joint implementation; stability of the core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q50 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf4:312
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