A Computational Approach to Proving Uniqueness in Dynamic Games
Karl Schmedders () and
Kenneth Judd ()
No 412, Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 from Society for Computational Economics
Dynamic games are used to analyze dynamic strategic interactions. While existence of equilibrium can often be proved by conventional methods, uniqueness is much more difficult to establish. If a game reduces to solving a system of polynomial equations, then one could use algorithms for finding all solutions to such systems to establish if equilibrium was unique. We study a common type of game where equilibrium can be analyzed as a sequence of small games and apply an all solutions algorithm to each such game
Keywords: nash equilibrium; multivariate polynomials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf5:412
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