Monetary and Fiscal Interactions without Commitment and the Value of Monetary Conservatism

Roberto Billi and Klaus Adam

No 62, Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: We study monetary and fiscal policy games in a dynamic sticky priceeconomy where monetary policy sets nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods financed with distortionary labor taxes. We compare the Ramsey outcome to non-cooperative policy regimes where one or both policymakers lack commitment power. Absence of fiscal commitment gives rise to a public spending bias, while lack of monetary commitment generates the well-known inflation bias. An appropriately conservative monetary authority can eliminate the steady state distortions generated by lack of monetary commitment and may even eliminate the distortions generated by lack of fiscal commitment. The costs associated with the central bank being overly conservative seem small, but insufficient conservatism may result in sizable welfare losses

Keywords: optimal monetary and fiscal policy; lack of commitment; sequential policy; discretionary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E62 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy (2008)
Working Paper: Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf5:62

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