Evolved Perception and Behaviour in Oligopolies

Robert Marks

Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: A previous study, which examined oligopolists as responding simply to past prices of their strategic rivals, used data from a mature market with stable rules of thumb (mappings from past actions or states of the market to present prices) for the oligopolists' behaviour, whether purposefully learnt or emerging from the natural selection of the rivalry. The earlier study imposed exogenous partitions on the action space, as perceived by the players. This study explores how such perceptions might be endogenised. A firm answer to the question of how oligopolists partition their perceptions of others' actions, both through time and across the price space, will also provide information on how much or how little information they choose to use: in short, how boundedly rational oligopolists are. We use data from a retail coffee market to examine the evolved optimal partitioning and mapping of price space, manifest as the oligopolists' rules of thumb.

References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.agsm.unsw.edu.au/~bobm/papers/geneva.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.agsm.unsw.edu.au/~bobm/papers/geneva.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://www.agsm.unsw.edu.au:443/~bobm/papers/geneva.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Evolved perception and behaviour in oligopolies (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf6:_038

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 from Society for Computational Economics Department of Econometrics, University of Geneva, 102 Bd Carl-Vogt, 1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().