Regulation or Markets? The Case of Employment Contract

W. Bentley Macleod ()

No 05.17, IEPR Working Papers from Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR)

Abstract: Regulation of the employment contract is both wide spread and diverse. The diversity of regulation is surprising because it suggests that there is little consensus regarding optimal intervention into the labor market. This paper discusses several economic reasons why it may be efficient for employers and employees to enter into long term contracts that make employee dismissal expensive. This analysis suggests that employment contracts can be expected to be complex in practice, and hence can be viewed as part of the technology of exchange. Given that knowledge of a technology requires skill and know-how, one cannot expect all employee-employer matches to discover and use the most efficient contract terms possible. It is suggested that the regulation of the employment relationship might be improved with the creation of a market for contracts, similar to the one that currently exists in the United States for construction projects.

JEL-codes: J30 J41 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:scp:wpaper:05-17

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