An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions

Lone Grønbæk and Marko Lindroos ()
Additional contact information
Marko Lindroos: Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki

No 50/03, Working Papers from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics

Abstract: The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities af-fects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less cooperation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among au-thorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort com-pared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Fisheries management; Quota enforcement; Self-enforcing policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2003-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sdu.dk/~/media/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Miljo/ime/wp/kronbak50.ashx First version, 2003-12 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.sdu.dk:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
Journal Article: An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sdk:wpaper:50

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ulla H. Oehlenschläger ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).