Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate Change - The Case of International Fisheries Agreements

Urs Steiner Brandt () and Lone Grønbæk
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Urs Steiner Brandt: Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark

No 73/06, Working Papers from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics

Abstract: Many international fisheries agreements involve sharing rules. The current pa-per analysis the stability of sharing rules when coping with long run changes in the composition of fish stocks in an international setting due to climate change. The exploitation of the cod stock in the Baltic Sea serves as an illustrative ex-ample. These rules are normally stable rules, but this is only true if they are not contingent on shifts in the relative distribution of density of the resource. Given the projected climatic changes in the latest IPCC report the stability of these agreements is not guaranteed. The lack of robustness of management systems of shared fish stocks with respect to exogenous changes has been addressed in sev-eral papers (see e.g. Miller (2005) and Miller and Munro (2004)). This paper builds, however, on a more rigorous game theoretic analysis conducted by Kronbak and Lindroos (2005). The main findings of this paper is that, when ex-ternalities are present, a decrease in the resource rent implies that the threat for not free riding become less serious and thereby leave less room for stable solu-tion. Generally speaking, this implies that climatic changes with a negative ef-fect on the resource rent make joint solutions less likely.

Keywords: Climate Change; Cooperative Games; Stability of Fisheries Agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C70 Q22 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
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