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On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

Lone Grønbæk and Marko Lindroos ()
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Marko Lindroos: Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki

No 79/08, Working Papers from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics

Abstract: Game-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. It is, however, the case that these types of models do not capture many real world mixed fisheries, where species are bio-logical independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting biodiversity preservation by setting up a two species model with the aim of ensuring both species survive harvesting of exploiters adapting a non-cooperative behaviour. The model starts out as a multi-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to include also biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the limits on the number of players preserving both species including the conditions to be satisfied. For visual purposes we simulate a two species model with different kind of interrelationship.

Keywords: Biodiversity preservation; non-cooperative game; multi-species fisheries; bio-economic modelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters (2010) Downloads
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