EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Are Intergovernmental Grants Tactical? The Evidence from Russia

Elena Jarocińska

No 361, CASE Network Studies and Analyses from CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research

Abstract: Two hypotheses about the determinants of Russian intergovernmental grants are tested empirically. According to first hypothesis, federal transfers to regions correlate with recent voting behavior of regional electorates. Second hypothesis states that transfers are higher in regions with politically powerful governors. We find a strong confirmation for the first hypothesis and no evidence for the second for years 1995-1998. This result is robust across specifications. Panel data analysis allows us to control for regional fixed effects. However, in years 1999-2001 election variables show no effect on transfers. It appears that in the nineties transfers were used by the incumbent government to enhance its reelection probabilities, while by the end of the century this mechanism was no longer in use as the transfer system has become more transparent and objective.

Keywords: Redistributive politics; intergovernmental grants; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H77 P26 R5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 Pages
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/20384652_sa361.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Intergovernmental grants in Russia (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sec:cnstan:0361

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CASE Network Studies and Analyses from CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Aleksandra Polak ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2021-11-01
Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0361