Russia’s Crony Capitalism: Stagnant But Stable

Anders Aslund ()

No 148, mBank - CASE Seminar Proceedings from CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research

Abstract: A conundrum this paper aims to explain is how Russia, a country that pursues such rigorous and conservative macroeconomic policies can be so tolerant of state and crony capitalism. The key issue is what Putin’s economic model amounts to, which is being presented already in section one. Section two reviews Russia’s recent economic performance, while the three ensuing sections examine three key aspects of the Russian economy, namely the eminent macroeconomic policy, the role of energy, and the impact of the Western sanctions since 2014. The final section attempts to answer the likelihood of serious market reforms.

Keywords: Russia; crony capitalism; corruption; macroeconomic policy; economic growth; gas and oil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 E01 E60 E65 H13 H63 P48 Q43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-mac and nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sec:mbanks:0148

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