Enhancing Credibility and Commitment to Fiscal Rules

Grzegorz Poniatowski

No 493, CASE Reports from CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to derive the characteristics of an effective fiscal governance framework, focusing on the incentives that ensure a commitment to the fiscal rules. We study this problem with the use of econometric tools, complementing this analysis with formal modelling through the lens of a dynamic principal-agent framework.

Keywords: Principal-Agent; Moral Hazard; Fiscal Effort; Fiscal Rules; Cyclically-Adjusted Balance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E61 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sec:report:0493

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