Corporate Governance and Control in Russian Banks

Andrei Vernikov ()

No 78, UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series from UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES)

Abstract: The Working Paper employs the paradigm of new institutional economics to examine peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors' control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.

Keywords: Corporate governance; control; banks; Russia; institutions; ownership; management; blockholder; state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2007-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Corporate governance and control in Russian banks (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:see:wpaper:78

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