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Slightly Altruistic Equilibria in Normal Form Games

Giuseppe De Marco and Jacqueline Morgan ()

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (2003). Existence is guaranteed for every finite game and for a large class of games with a continuum of strategies. Results and examples emphasize the (lack of) connections with classical refinement concepts. Finally, it is shown that under a pseudo-monotonicity assumption on a particular operator associated to the game it is possible, by selecting slightly altruistic equilibria, to eliminate those equilibria in which a player can switch to a strategy that is better for the others without leaving the set of equilibria.

Date: 2007-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
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Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2008, 137(2), 347-362

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