Fairness Properties of Constrained Market Equilibria

Chiara Donnini (), Maria Graziano and Marialaura Pesce
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Chiara Donnini: Università di Napoli Parthenope

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: This paper studies the notion of fairness in pure exchange economies involving uncertainty and asymmetric information. We propose a new concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when the equity of allocations is evaluated at the {\it interim} stage. Some characterizations of constrained market equilibria are derived extending the analysis to economies that have both an atomic and an atomless sector.

Keywords: Mixed markets; coalitional fairness; envy; efficiency; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Economics, 2012, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-012-0322-4 with the title "Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies"

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