Gifts, Bequests and Growth

Berthold Wigger (berthold.wigger@googlemail.com)

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: A familiar result in the theory of private intergenerational transfers is that competitive equilibria with gifts from children to their parents are dynamically inefficient whereas they are dynamically efficient with bequests from parents to their children. This note demonstrates that if growth is endogenous, both gift and bequest economies are dynamically efficient, but gift economies grow more rapidly.

Keywords: Altruism; Dynamic Efficiency; Endogenous Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 E21 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Macroeconomics, 2001, vol. 23, pages 121-129

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Journal Article: Gifts, Bequests, and Growth (2001)
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