Reciprocity in the Principal Multiple Agent Model
Giuseppe De Marco and
Giovanni Immordino ()
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
This paper studies how incentives are affected by intention-based reciprocity preferences when the principal hires many agents. Our results describe the agents' psychological attitudes required to sustain a given strategy profile. We also show that hiring reciprocal agents to implement a first or a second-best contract will always benefit the principal if the strategy profile is symmetric. When instead the profile (first or second-best) is asymmetric the principal's best interest might be better served by self-interested agents. We conclude the paper by clarifying when symmetric profiles are most likely to arise.
Keywords: reciprocity; many agents; psychological games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Reciprocity in the Principal–Multiple Agent Model (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:314
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