Games Equilibria and the Variational Representation of Preferences
Giuseppe De Marco and
Maria Romaniello ()
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Maria Romaniello: Seconda Università di Napoli
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
In this paper we consider a model of games of incomplete information under ambiguity in which players are endowed with variational preferences. We provide an existence result for the corresponding mixed equilibrium notion. Then we study the limit behavior of equilibria under perturbations on the indices of ambiguity aversion.
Keywords: Incomplete information games; multiple priors; variational preferences; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Published in Applied Mathematical Sciences, Vol. 7, 2013, no. 96, 4789-4800 (http://dx.doi.org/10.12988/ams.2013.37355)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:336
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