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Ambiguous Games without a State Space and Full Rationality

Giuseppe De Marco

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: Aim of this paper to differentiate and to better understand the assumptions that must be imposed on the structure of ambiguity and on the attitudes towards ambiguity in order to have the existence of equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences. In the present paper, this class of games is studied under weaker restrictions on preferences which are not required to be rational. This paper shows that the assumption of imprecision averse (resp. loving) preferences is key to obtain equilibrium existence whenever it is combined with the property of convexity (resp. concavity) of the ambiguous belief correspondences. The paper also studies the role played by these assumptions in different specific models, so as to illustrate the applicability of the results of equilibrium existence.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
Date: 2016-01-18, Revised 2017-04-01
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