Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud

Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino and Giancarlo Spagnolo
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Paolo Buccirossi: LEAR

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: It is often claimed that rewards for whistleblowers lead to fraudulent reports, but for several US programs this has not been a major problem. We model the interaction be- tween rewards for whistleblowers, sanctions against fraudulent reporting, judicial errors and standards of proof in the court case on a whistleblower.s allegations and the pos- sible follow-up for fraudulent allegations. Balancing whistleblower rewards, sanctions against fraudulent reports, and courts.standards of proof is essential for these policies to succeed. When the risk of retaliation is severe, larger rewards are needed and so are tougher sanctions against fraudulent reports. The precision of the legal system must be su¢ ciently high, hence these programs are not viable in weak institution environ- ments, where protection is imperfect and court precision low, or where sanctions against false reporting are mild. Internal reporting channels may interfere with external ones in unexpected ways.

Keywords: Whistleblowers rewards; False allegations; Judicial errors; Standard of proof; Corporate fraud (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-21, Revised 2017-09-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud (2021)
Working Paper: Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud (2017)
Working Paper: Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:477

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