Marginal Deterrence at Work

Rosario Crino (), Giovanni Immordino (), Gülen Karakoç-Palminteri and Salvatore Piccolo ()
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Giovanni Immordino: Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF
Gülen Karakoç-Palminteri: Università di Milano Bicocca

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement --- i.e., the need for graduating the penalty to the severity of the crime. We combine individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring costs across US states over 50 years. Consistent with the theory of marginal deterrence, we show that an increase in maximum penalty or a decrease in monitoring cost are associated with longer sentences. We also provide evidence that steeper sanctions are associated with less severe crimes, consistent with marginal deterrence being effective. Overall, these findings favor the marginal deterrence framework over competing theories of justice.

Keywords: Marginal Deterrence; Enforcement Policies; Individual-Level Data; Death Penalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-07-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, 166, 586-612

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http://www.csef.it/WP/wp478.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Marginal deterrence at work (2019)
Working Paper: Marginal Deterrence at Work (2017)
Working Paper: Marginal Deterrence at Work (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:478

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