M&A Advisory and the Merger Review Process
Michele Bisceglia (),
Salvatore Piccolo () and
Additional contact information
Michele Bisceglia: Università di Bergamo
Salvatore Piccolo: Università di Bergamo and CSEF
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
Two firms propose a merger to the antitrust authority. They are uninformed about the efficiencies generated by the merger, but can hire an expert to gather information on their behalf. The authority is also uninformed about the merger's efficiencies, but can run a costly internal investigation to learn them. We analyze the effect of the disclosure of the expert's contract on consumer welfare, and show that consumers are not necessarily better off with disclosure. This negative effect hinges on a free-riding problem between expert and authority in the information acquisition game, and is more relevant in highly competitive industries.
Keywords: Advice; Competition Policy; Mergers; Advisory Contract; Disclosure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L11 L42 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:515
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lia Ambrosio ().