Strict Fairness of Equilibria in Mixed and Asymmetric Information Economies
Chiara Donnini () and
Maria Laura Pesce ()
Additional contact information
Chiara Donnini: Università di Napoli Parthenope
Maria Laura Pesce: Università di Napoli Federico II
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
We investigate the fairness property of equal-division competitive market equilibria (CME) in asymmetric information economies with a space of agents that may contain non-negligible (large) traders. We first propose an extension to our framework of the notion of strict fairness due to Zhou (1992). We prove that once agents are asymmetrically informed, any equal-division CME allocation is strictly fair, but a strictly fair allocation might not be supported by an equilibrium price. Then, we investigate the role of large traders and we provide two sufficient conditions under which, in the case of complete information economies, a redistribution of resources is strictly fair if and only if it results from a competitive mechanism.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; mixed markets; strict fairness; competitive equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D60 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:528
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lia Ambrosio ().