Generalized Coalitions and Bargaining Sets

Maria Graziano, Marialaura Pesce and Niccolo Urbinati ()
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Niccolo Urbinati: Università Ca Foscari Venezia

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We introduce new notions of bargaining set for mixed economies which rest on the idea of generalized coalitions (Aubin1979) to define objections and counter-objections. We show that the bargaining set defined through generalized coalitions coincides with competitive allocations under assumptions which are weak and natural in the mixed market literature. As a further result, we identify some additional properties that a generalized coalition must satisfy to object an allocation.

Keywords: Coalitions; Generalized Coalitions; Core; Bargainig Set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D4 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets (2020)
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