Self-Preferencing in Markets with Vertically-Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms
Jorge Padilla,
Joe Perkins and
Salvatore Piccolo ()
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Jorge Padilla: Compass Lexecon
Joe Perkins: Compass Lexecon
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
Abstract:
The competitive strategies of 'gatekeeper' platforms are subject to enhanced scrutiny. For instance, Apple and Google are being accused of charging excessive access fees to app providers and privileging their own apps. Some have argued that such allegations make no economic sense when the platform's business model is to sell devices. In this paper, we build a model in which a gatekeeper device-seller facing potentially saturated demand for its device has the incentive and the ability to exclude from the market third-party suppliers of a service that consumers buy via its devices. Foreclosure is more likely if demand growth for the platform's devices is slow or negative, and can harm consumers if the device-seller's services are inferior to those offered by the third parties.
Keywords: Durable Goods; Foreclosure; Gatekeeper Platforms; Self-Preferencing; Vertical Integration. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L41 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:582
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