Fairness and Formation Rules of Coalitions

Chiara Donnini () and Marialaura Pesce
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Chiara Donnini: Università di Napoli Parthenope

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: In this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents of an exchange economy and how certain limitations imposed on coalition formation may impact the set of allocations judged fair. The study is conducted in atomless economies as well as in the so-called mixed markets.

Keywords: Fairness; Envy-freeness; Equal-income Walrasian allocations; Coalitions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D51 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09-29, Revised 2023-05-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.csef.it/WP/wp624.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fairness and formation rules of coalitions (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:624

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