Trust in times of AI
Francesco Fallucchi and
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
In an online, pre-registered experiment, we explore the impact of AI mediated communication within the context of a Trust Game with unverifiable actions. We compare a baseline treatment, where no communication is allowed, to treatments where participants can use free-form communication or have the additional option of using ChatGPT-generated promises, which were assessed in a companion experiment. We confirm previous observations that communication bolsters trust and trustworthiness. In the AI treatment, trustworthiness sees the most significant increase, yet trust levels decline for those who opt not to write a message. AI-generated promises become more frequent but garner less trust. Consequently, the overall trust and efficiency levels in the AI treatment align with that of human communication. Contrary to our assumptions, less trustworthy individuals do not show a higher propensity to delegate messages to ChatGPT.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Trust Game; ChatGPT; Experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D83 D84 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:689
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