The Veto Power of The Grand Coalition in Economies With Consumption Externalities

Maria Gabriella Graziano (), Marialaura Pesce and Vincenzo Platino ()
Additional contact information
Maria Gabriella Graziano: Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF, https://csef.it/people/maria-gabriella-graziano/
Vincenzo Platino: University of Naples Federico II and CSEF., https://csef.it/people/vincenzo-platino/

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to provide some new cooperative characterizations of competitive equilibria in pure exchange economies with consumption externalities. In this framework, several notions of equilibrium supported by prices are possible. The central notion analyzed in the paper is the one of A-equilibrium in which individual preferences are affected by consumption externalities in a very broad sense. Indeed, each individual i takes into account in her preferences the consumption of a group of agents Ai exogenously given. Following Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008), Hervés-Beloso et al. (2005), Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2009), we show that the veto power of the grand coalition is enough to characterize A-equilibria despite the presence of externalities and provide applications in connection with strategic market games. Our results, for suitable choices of the sets Ai, imply characterizations of Walras-Nash, Berge, total and family equilibria of pure exchange economies with externalities.

Keywords: Exchange economy; consumption externalities; Aubin core; Edgeworth equilibria; robust efficiency; two-player games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.csef.it/WP/wp726.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:726

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Maria Carannante ().