Estimation of Games under No Regret: Structural Econometrics for AI
Niccolò Lomys () and
Lorenzo Magnolfi ()
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Niccolò Lomys: CSEF and Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, https://csef.it/people/niccolo-lomys/
Lorenzo Magnolfi: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, https://econ.wisc.edu/staff/magnolfi-lorenzo/
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
Abstract:
We develop a method to recover primitives from data generated by artificial intelligence (AI) agents in strategic environments such as online marketplaces and auctions. Building on how leading online learning AIs are designed, we assume agents minimize their regret. Under asymptotic no regret, we show that time-average play converges to the set of Bayes coarse correlated equilibrium (BCCE) predictions. Our econometric procedure is based on BCCE restrictions and convergence rates of regretminimizing AIs. We apply the method to pricing data in a digital marketplace for used smartphones. We estimate sellers’ cost distributions and find lower markups than in centralized platforms.
Keywords: AI Decision-Making; Empirical Games; Regret Minimization; Bayes (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium; Partial Identification. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 C5 C7 D4 D8 L1 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11-15
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:739
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