Approximations in Multi-Leader-Multi-Follower Games via Variational Inequalities Abstract: Problems associated to Multi-Leader-Multi-Follower games may fail to have solutions, particularly in the case of pessimistic behavior of the leaders. In this paper, we propose to obviate to this deficiency by introducing approximate and viscosity solutions constructed with the aid of suitable approximate Nash equilibria of the second stage game. More specifically, the parametric followers Nash equilibrium problem is approximated by using Minty variational inequalities or classical variational inequalities and it is shown, among others, that approximate and viscosity solutions of the pessimistic Multi-Leader-Multi-Follower problem exist under not restrictive assumptions when we use Minty’s variational inequalities

M. Beatrice Lignola () and Jacqueline Morgan ()
Additional contact information
M. Beatrice Lignola: University of Naples Federico II, https://www.international.unina.it/
Jacqueline Morgan: University of Naples Federico II and CSEF, https://csef.it/people/jacqueline-morgan/

Keywords: Multi-Leader-Multi-Follower; game; -; Pessimistic; behavior; -; Variational; inequality; -Minty; variational; inequality; -; Approximate; solution; -; Viscosity; solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.csef.it/WP/wp772.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:772

More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Maria Carannante ().