Coordination in complex environments

Pietro Dall’ Ara ()
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Pietro Dall’ Ara: University of Naples Federico II and CSEF, https://csef.it/people/pietro-dallara/

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: Coordination is an important aspect of innovative contexts, where: the more innovative a course of action, the more uncertain its outcome. To study the interplay of coordination and informational “complexity”, I embed a beauty-contest game into a complex environment. I identify a new conformity phenomenon. This effect may push towards exploration of unknown alternatives, or constitute a status quo bias, depending on the network structure of the players’ interaction. In an application, I show that an organization with decentralized authority can implement profit maximization in a sufficiently complex environment.

Keywords: Coordination; Conformity; Complexity; Status Quo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-27
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