Corporate Governance and Cartel formation
Suha Alawi ()
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Suha Alawi: King Abdulaziz university
No 401246, Proceedings of Economics and Finance Conferences from International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences
This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and cartel formation, A firm?s participation in cartel depends upon the potential problems that may arise due to price fixing and the incentives provided to the management. The top levels of management such as the board of directors and the CEO are responsible for deciding if the firm will participate in the cartel and manage the corporate governance activities of collusive price fixing agreements. The study is focused on UK cartel firms which has the highest representation in the sample. A total number of 150 cartel firms in 52 cases from all around the world between the years 1990 to 2008 are involved in this study, of which 114 are UK firms. Therefore, this study is dominated by UK firms. The study concludes that UK-based cartel firms characterised by having larger board size compared to non-cartel firms; lower percentage of independent directors (non-executive); higher average of board remuneration; less likely that cartel is formed by family-owned and controlled firm (large shareholders); having older CEOs represented on the board; having CEO who served a less number of years as a director; less likely to have a female CEO represented; more likely to have CEOs who?s combined CEO-chairman position; and a higher average of CEOs bonuses and compensation packages.
Keywords: Cartels; Antitrust agreements; Corporate governance; Competition; Agency theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
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Published in Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2nd Economics & Finance Conference, Vienna, Jul 2014, pages 14-38
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sek:iefpro:0401246
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