Third party punishment and criminal behavior: an experiment with Italian Camorra prison inmates

Annamaria Nese (anese@unisa.it), Arturo Palomba, Patrizia Sbriglia and Maurizio Scudiero (maurizio.scudiero@giustizia.it)
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Annamaria Nese: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno
Maurizio Scudiero: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno

No 3_226, Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno

Abstract: In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a social norm by an uninvolved observer - or third party - whose payoff is unaffected by the behavior of the same agent. In our research, we attempt to improve the understanding of Third Party punishment by reproducing an experiment conducted by Fehr et al. 2004 (TP-PD) with a sample of Camorra prison inmates. We then compare the decisions of the Camorra inmates with the behavior of university students with similar social and economic backgrounds. Our primary conclusion is that there are significant differences in cooperative and sanctioning behavior.

Keywords: Camorra; prison inmates; social values; social norms; sanction; punishment; reciprocity; social preference; third party; normative criteria; laboratory experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C92 D23 D63 K42 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Working Papers, November 2012, pages 1-10.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Third party punishment and criminal behavior: an experiment with the Italian Camorra prison inmates (2013)
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