Party Nomination Procedures and Quality of Government
Fernando Aragon ()
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
This paper explores empirically the relation between party's procedures to nominate candidates, such as primaries, and quality of government. Using a panel data of Latin America countries, I find robust evidence that the quality of government is higher during the mandate of primary-nominated presidents. The empirical strategy exploits within country variation and controls for relevant covariates at country and party level. Using an instrumental variable approach with determinants of primary adoption produces similar results. The findings are consistent with primaries increasing incentives among candidates to improve policy design, and suggest that party institutions matter for governance.
Keywords: Governance; Political parties; Candidate nomination procedures; Primaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Political Parties, Candidate Selection, and Quality of Government (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp12-10
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